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PERFORMANCE IMPLICATION OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION: EVIDENCE FROM SRI LANKAN
FIRMS
Athula Manawaduge, Dr. Anura De Zoysa and Dr. Kathy Rudkin
School of Accounting and Finance, University of Wollongong, Australia
Abstract
Purpose - This paper seeks to examine the impact of ownership concentration
and ownership structure on firms’ performance of a sample of public listed
companies in Sri Lanka in the premise of an agency theory framework.
Design/methodology/approach - The paper first investigates the nature of
ownership structure and concentration and then examines whether there is
strong evidence to support the observation that the variations of ownership
structure across firms result in systematic variations in firm performance. This
hypothesis is tested by assessing the impact of ownership structure and
concentration on firm performance measured in terms of accounting
profitability and market performance using data for 45 Sri Lankan listed
companies.
Findings – The main finding indicates that there is a significant relationship
between ownership concentration (SH10) and the performance of Sri Lankan
companies measured in terms of an accounting performance measure of Return
on Assets (ROA). However, no significant relationship was found between the
Herfindahl index (HERF), which is a measure of ownership concentration, and
any of the performance measures tested in the study. The insignificance of the
HERF suggests that there could be a nonlinear relationship between ownership
concentration and a firm’s performance. This study also did not find a
relationship between market-based performance measures of companies and
ownership concentration or the ownership structure of the Sri Lankan
companies. This finding suggests the existence of market anomalies common
to most of the emerging markets.
Keywords: corporate ownership, ownership concentration, corporate governance,
performance, emerging markets, Sri Lanka

Introduction
Effective corporate governance is of importance to any country because of its direct influence
on economic development. Hence, designing corporate governance mechanisms for effective
decision-making is paramount. The concept of corporate governance covers large number of
distinct economic relations. One such relation is corporate ownership structure and its
influence on corporate performance which is the main focus of this paper. Much of the
literature on the governance of modern corporate entities is based on the assumption that the
corporate ownership is widely dispersed where the ownership and control is separated
between owners (principal) and managers (agent).
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This notion originally derives from Berle and Means (1932) and has been much propagated
after the seminal work by Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, recent literature shows a
high level of ownership concentration in corporate entities in many developed and developing
countries especially outside the Anglo-Saxon countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta
et al., 1999). It is therefore important to examine the impact of ownership structure and
concentration on a firm’s performance in this context. Theoretically, it can be argued that the
ownership concentration may improve performance by decreasing monitoring costs or
decline due to the possibility that large shareholders use their control rights to achieve private
benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
Performance implications of ownership concentration have been examined empirically by
various researchers and have produced mixed results. For example Demsetz and Lehn (1985)
find no effect of ownership concentration on accounting profit whereas Leech and Leahy
(1991) find a negative relationship between the ownership concentration and firm’s value and
profitability. On the other hand, Zeitun and Gary (2007) find significant positive relationship
between ownership concentration and the accounting performance measure of return on
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) and Morck et al. (1988) find a non-linear
relationship between insider ownership and firm performance in their examination of
examining Fortune 500 firms for the year 1980. However, most research on ownership
concentration and performance has been conducted in developed countries. There is an
increasing awareness that the theories originated based on the evidence collected on
developed countries such as the USA and the UK may have limited applicability to emerging
market due to the vast differences in political, socio-cultural and business contexts between
the developed and developing countries.
In general emerging markets have distinct political economic and institutional characteristics
which limit the application of an empirical model originated in developed markets. Recent
studies on corporate governance suggest that social, economic and cultural factors of a
country affect corporate ownership structure which in turn impacts on a firm’s performance
(Zeitun and Gary, 2007). Due to historical and economic reasons, Sri Lankan companies’
governance structure and practices are very much influenced by neo-liberal reinforcement of
good governance practices (Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2004). However, the
ownership structure of Sri Lankan companies is characterized by the controlling shareholder
usually being another corporate entity; wide prevalence of family ownership as the ultimate
owners; extensive use of a pyramid ownership structure, cross-holdings and participation in
management by controlling shareholders to enhance corporate control; and an absence of a
large community of arms-length institutional shareholders (Senaratne and Gunaratne, 2007).
Corporate control is therefore often in the hands of a few individuals, families or corporate
groups who hold the majority of ownership. These features have created a unique business
environment which is vastly different to that found in developed countries.
This paper examines the impact of ownership structure and ownership concentration on
firms’ performance of a sample of public listed companies in Sri Lanka in the premise of an
agency theory framework. This paper is motivated by the lack of evidence about the
relationship between corporate structure and firm performance in Sri Lankan firms.
Samarakoon (1999) examined the ownership structure of companies listed on the Colombo
Stock Exchange (CSE) and found that the ownership of these companies is highly
concentrated, with a controlling shareholder in most companies. The existing governance
structure of Sri Lankan companies being dominated by controlling shareholders, shows some
similarity to the inside systems corporate governance model. However, whether there is an
2

impact from the presence of controlling shareholders’ participation in corporate management
on firm performance is the question examined in this study.. Hence, this study examines
whether agency theory is equally valid for explaining the relationship between performance
and ownership structure in the developing economy of Sri Lanka.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief review of the
existing literature on the effects of ownership structure and concentration on firms’
performance. Section three explains the data and variables selection methods employed for
the study. The empirical analysis and results are presented in the fourth section. Section five
concludes the discussion.

Literature review
Governance issues arise when ownership of a legal entity is separated from its management
(Tricker, 2000). This intensifies the need to search for good governance practices, as
identified by Berle and Means (1932). Central to this analysis is agency theory which
explains the conflict of interest between inside owners and outside shareholders (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that relative to the amount of ownership
held by insiders, managers are provided with incentives to pursue activities to serve their own
benefits, which in turn are aligned also to enhance the firm value. According to their
hypothesis, both a firm’s value and its performance increase with the level of insider
ownership.
The market centric economies are largely characterized by the existence of a widely held
ownership structure, highly liquid stock markets due to good investor protection and control
of companies by professional managers on behalf of scattered shareholders (Bhasa2004). In
these economies, corporate management has more power to make decisions, and these
decisions may frequently be in their own interest, which may give rise to an agency cost.
Agency theory argues that ownership concentration may improve firm performance by
decreasing agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim that
agency costs consist of three different components: monitoring costs, bonding costs and
residual loss. Monitoring costs are the control costs incurred by the principal to mitigate the
devious behavior of the manager. Bonding costs are incurred to ensure that the manager takes
decisions beneficial to the principal. Residual loss is a political cost that occurs when both the
above kind of costs fails to control the divergent behavior of the manager. Further, Jensen
and Meckling (1976) showed formally how the allocation of shares among insiders and
outsiders can influence the agency cost and value of the firm. Since then, the relationship
between ownership and firm performance has attracted special attention. Agency theory
perspective and empirical literature thereof usually considers insider ownership as the main
corporate mechanism that affects firm value. However, empirical evidence regarding the
relationship between ownership concentration and the financial performance or firm’s value
has shown mix results (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001;
Thomsen et al., 2006). Despite the wealth of research the question whether a large number of
owners, or a concentration of ownership, contributes to reduced agency costs, thereby
improving the firm value and financial performance remains unanswered.
The agency theory hypothesis that ownership concentration may improve firm performance
by decreasing agency costs was first challenged by Demsets (1983), who argues that the
ownership structure of a corporation should be thought of as an endogenous outcome of
decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders. According to Demsetz (1983), there
3

should be no systematic relation between variations in ownership structure and variations in
firm performance. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) provide evidence of the endogeneity of a firm’s
ownership structure. They used a measure of the profit rate on a fraction of shares owned by
the five largest shareholding interests and found no evidence of any relation between the
profit rate and the ownership concentration. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show the
importance of the role played by large shareholders, and how the price of a firm’s shares
increases as the proportion of shares held by large shareholders rises. They argue
theoretically for a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm value.
In a seminal study, Morck et al. (1988) ignored the endogeneity issue altogether and reexamined the relation between corporate ownership structure and performance measured in
terms of Tobin’s Q and proposed a non-linear relationship between insider ownership and
firm performance. They found a positive relationship between corporate ownership structure
and Tobin’s Q for less than 5 per cent board ownership range, a negative relationship
between 5 per cent to 25 per cent range and a positive relationship for ownership exceeding
25 per cent. However their results are not supported with accounting based performance
measures. Wu and Cui (2002) found that there is a positive relation between ownership
concentration and accounting profits, indicated by return on assets (ROA) and return on
equity (ROE), but the relation is negative with respect to the market value measured by the
share price-earning ratio (P/E) and market price to book value ratio (M/B).
Corporate governance mechanisms vary around the world and can produce different
ownership effects on firms’ performance. Corporate governance literature identifies the
existence of four different models of governance viz., outsider system (market-centric model)
insider system (relationship-based model), transition model and emerging governance model.
These models are widely different in terms of how those associated are accountable in the
process of the separation of ownership and control within the organization (Bhasa, 2004). In
countries such as USA and UK where market-centric mechanisms are in operation, firms
substantially rely on the legal protection of investors and an ownership structure that is
dispersed. In Europe and Japan where relationship mechanism is in operation, there is less
reliance on elaborate legal protections, and more reliance on large investors and banks. In the
rest of the world, ownership is typically heavily concentrated in families, in which the legal
protection is weaker than the other types of ownership. The market-centric and relationshipbased governance models have been widely discussed in governance literature providing
evidence as to how the differences in economic characteristics bring about different
governance practices with different performance efficiency. Nevertheless, emerging
governance models have not been extensively examined. While an increasing body of
literature has referred to the potential differences in economic characteristics of developing
counties, much less discussion is available in respect of the corporate structure, governance
practices and their influence on performance of the firm.
Corporate governance issues are extensively examined under various theoretical perspectives
such as the agency, stewardship, stakeholder and the political models. These theoretical
perspectives provide different viewpoints to investigate firms and their governance (Turnbull,
1997). However, the dominant focus in mainstream literature has been from an agency
perspective of the firm with a view to securing owners’ interests by reducing agency cost.
Most of these theories are developed and examined in the developed economies assuming
contextual conditions of these economies provide universal reference. Tricker (cited in
Turnbull, 1997) states “stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and agency theory are all
essentially ethnocentric. Although the underlying ideological paradigms are seldom
4

articulated, the essential ideas are derived from Western thought, with its perceptions and
expectations of the respective roles of individual, enterprise and the state and of the
relationships between them.” An increasing body of literature has referred to the potential
differences in economic characteristics of developing countries. However, interaction of these
economic characteristics with governance and corporate structures and performance
implications of these factors have not been examined extensively even though the empirical
studies on ownership structure on firms’ performance, mostly from developed countries, have
provided divergent evidence. These contextual differences across countries therefore, create
another dimension to the ownership structure and performance issue. In an attempt to
reconcile this divergent evidence, Udayasankar and Das (2007) notionally explained the
performance implication of corporate governance in the context of the exogenous
environment supported with multiple theories of corporate governance such as agency,
stakeholder, resource-dependence, and institutional theories and created an argument that the
regulation and competitive forces in the environment interact with the governance practices
of firms, resulting in idiosyncratic effects on performance.
Because of the contextual differences across countries, different relations between ownership
and firm value could be expected. For example, in emerging economies, where firm
ownership is highly concentrated with family ownership, a positive and significant effect of
ownership concentration on firm performance is proposed. This argument is confirmed by the
study of Zeitun and Gary (2007). They examine the relationship of ownership concentration,
and firm performance both in term of accounting measures and market measures using a
sample of public listed companies in the Jordan stock exchange, and found that there is a
significant relation between ownership concentration and the accounting performance
measures. Abor and Biekpe (2007) investigated whether the effects of corporate governance
and ownership structure on the performance of SME’s in Ghana. They find that board size,
board composition, CEO duality, inside ownership and family ownership have significant
positive impacts on profitability.
In spite of all these efforts to investigate the effect of ownership structure on firms’
performance until now there are few studies which analyze the ownership structure and its
main characteristics, but there is no study to the effect of ownership structure on firms’
performance on Sri Lanka companies.

Data and variables
Data
The data used in this study included 45 publicly listed companies on the Colombo Stock
Exchange (CSE) for the year 2007/2008. These companies are selected randomly covering
fourteen different industrial sectors out of twenty industrial sectors represented in the CSE.
The sectors represented include Beverage Food & Tobacco, Chemical, Diversified, Heath
Care, Hotel & Travel, Investment Trust, Land & Property, Manufacturing, Motors,
Plantation, Power & Energy, Services, Telecommunications and Trading. However, the
Banking, Finance and Insurance sector is excluded from the initial sample selection process
since applicable regulation for this sector especially in respect of share ownership;
profitability measures and liquidity assessment are vastly different from the firms in the other
industrial sectors. The major items of interest are balance sheets, income statements,
ownership structure, and the percentage holdings of all main shareholders. As per the listing
rules of the CSE, all listed companies should prepare financial statements based on the Sri
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Lanka Accounting Standards which are adopted from International Accounting Standards.
Furthermore, information in respect of distribution of shares, composition of shareholders in
terms of institutional and individual and the shareholding of twenty major shareholders has to
be disclosed in the annual reports. Table 1 presents the profile of companies in the sample.
Total Assets
Rs. Millions Frequency
%
0-100
7
16%
101-500
8
18%
501-1000
11
24%
1001-5000
12
27%
5001-10000
5
11%
>10000
2
4%
45
100%
Descriptive statistics
Rs. Millions
Mean
3,883
Standard Deviation
11,248
Minimum
8
Maximum
69,907

Sales
Rs. Millions Frequency
%
0-25
4
9%
26-100
11
24%
101-1000
16
36%
1001-2500
7
16%
2501-10000
5
11%
>10000
2
4%
45
100%
Descriptive statistics
Rs. Millions
Mean
1,851
Standard Deviation
4,949
Minimum
4
Maximum
31,129

Age

ROA
Per cent
<1
1-2.5
2.5-7.5
7.5-15
20
>20

Years

Frequency
1
3
21
8
11
1
45
Descriptive statistics
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
0-5
6-15
16-30
31-50
51-100
>100

%
2%
7%
47%
18%
24%
2%
100%
Years
36
25
5
164

Frequency
8
5
16
11
3
2
45
Descriptive statistics
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum

%
18%
11%
36%
24%
7%
4%
100%
Per cent
6.68
6.73
-4.60
27.80

Table 1: Profile of the Companies in the Sample
As shown in Table 1, there is a significant dispersion between the size of sample companies
measured by either total assets or the sales. The total assets of sample companies ranged from
8 million rupees to 69,907 millions, showing a massive disparity. While the average total
assets of companies amounted to 3,883 million rupees, the total assets of the majority of
companies (58%) were less than 1,000 million rupees. A similar situation is observed when
the size of the companies is measured in terms of sales, which varied from 4 million rupees to
31,129 million rupees between companies, also showing a huge disparity between sample
companies in terms of sales. The sample companies consisted of both young and old
companies with the age of companies ranging from 5 to 164 years. The majority of
companies in the sample (56%) were less than 30 years old and 74 per cent of companies
were less than 50 years old. As for the profitability level of companies, once again there was
6

a wide disparity. While 41 companies in the sample were profitable, the remaining 4
companies were earning negative returns on their assets in the year 2008. The average
profitability ratio of the sample companies in 2008 was 6.7% while the majority of
companies (65 %) earned less than 7.5% of return on their assets.
Variables
Return on assets (ROA) is used as an accounting performance measure while Tobin’s Q (TQ)
and market-to-book value ratio (MBR) are employed as the market performance measures of
firms. These performance variables represent the dependent variables used separately in the
regression model. The concentration ratios, ownership fraction ratio, and other control
variables are used as explanatory variables.
To determine the ownership concentration initially five variables have been constructed
namely the percentage held by the largest shareholder (SH1), the percentage held by two
largest shareholders (SH2), the percentage held by first three largest shareholders (SH3) the
percentage held by first five largest shareholders (SH5) and the percentage held by first ten
largest shareholders (SH10). Further, the Herfindahl Index (HERF) of ownership
concentration i.e. the sum of squared percentage of shares controlled by each top five
shareholders is also used as a concentration variable. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics
for the concentration variable for the sample. All concentration ratios indicate that ownership
is highly concentrated. The average of largest shareholder’s ownership is 44 per cent whereas
first ten largest shareholders’ ownership average is as high as 80 percent. The data also reveal
that there is a substantial variation across firms in ownership concentration. Despite the high
average, the largest owner’s ownership varies between 10 per cent and 83 per cent. The
average value of median of largest shareholder’s ownership in France and Spain is 20 and 34
per cent respectively (Becht and Roell, 1999). The range of median in Sri Lankan firms is
considerably high by this standard.
Variable
Mean
SD
Minimum
SH1
44.24
21.21
10.57
SH2
57.04
19.82
20.70
SH3
63.62
17.74
25.27
SH5
71.14
15.19
30.27
SH10
79.35
12.06
41.49
HERF
2724.70 1823.77
270.97
Table 2: Ownership Concentration Variables
Variable
SH1
SH2
SH3
SH5
SH1
1
SH2
0.934145
1
SH3
0.884755 0.980014
1
SH5
0.778855
0.8903 0.953456
1
SH10
0.564655 0.684845 0.781763
0.91311
HERF
0.976334 0.927397 0.891786
0.806802
Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Concentration Variables

Median Maximum
47.00
83.15
57.75
92.01
64.86
93.91
70.65
95.99
81.03
100.00
2537.82
6923.55

SH10

1
0.623622

HERF

1

To determine the appropriate concentration variables for the regression model, the correlation
coefficient matrix of the variables has been constructed as presented in Table 3. After
eliminating highly correlated variables, SH10 and HERF index are used as indictors of
7

ownership concentration to investigate whether ownership concentration increased firms’
performance.
Most of the studies about the relation between ownership structure and firm performance
used managerial ownership as the measure of ownership structure. However, the ownership
structure of Sri Lankan companies is characterized by peculiar features such as the
controlling shareholder is usually another corporate entity; wide prevalence of family
ownership as the ultimate owners; extensive use of a pyramid ownership structure and crossholdings (Senaratne and Gunaratne, 2007). In this sample 38 of the companies have another
company as its major shareholder. Further, very high percentage of shares is owned by
institutional investors. These shareholders are different in their interests in the firm and their
incentives and ability to monitor the firm. To determine whether there is an influence of this
ownership structure on firm performance two fraction ratios (F) i.e. the fraction of shares
owned by other institutions (F-Com), and the fraction owned by individuals (F-Ind) are
constructed. Table 4 present descriptive statistics for the fraction variables for the sample. An
important question addressed in this study is whether ownership structure has an impact on
performance.
Variable
Percentage of shares owned by another
institutions (F-Com)
Percentage of shares owned by
individuals (F-Ind)
Table 4: Ownership Structure

Mean SD

Minimum Median Maximum

68.64 23.90

11.59

73.76

99.99

31.36 23.90

0.01

26.24

88.41

Factors other than ownership structure may also affect a firm’s performance. To take them
into account, a set of control variables have been incorporated into the regression model.
These control variables include total assets (T-Ast), total sales (TS), firm age (Age), total
debt to total asset (TD/TA) and total debt to total equity ratio (TD/TE). The relationship
between variables is estimated using regression analysis.

Analysis and results
This study examines the relationship between variations in ownership concentration variables
and ownership structure variables, and the firms’ performance. The hypothesis tested is that
ownership concentration does affect the firm’s performance positively.
The estimated equation to test the hypothesis is as follows.
Y = β0 + β1 (SH10) + β2 Log (Sales) + β3 Log (Age) + β4 (TD/TA) + β5 (F) + e (1)
where Y is alternatively ROA, TQ, and MBR for firm i as a measure of performance. The
independent variables are represented by the concentration ratio (SH), ownership fraction
ratio (F), log sales, log age and TD/TA ratio. Only SH10 and the HERF are used as
concentration ratios in the estimation to investigate the effect ownership concentrations on
firm’s performance. F is alternatively F-Com and F-Ind where as e is an error term.
The results of the regression are reported in Table 5 where SH10 is used for the ownership
concentration. Table 6 presents the regression results where HERF is used for the ownership
concentration. The SH10 variables were found to have a positive and significant impact on
ROA at least at a 5 percent level of significance for various equations as indicated in Table 5.
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However, the estimated coefficient of HERF has no impact on ROA. Neither the HERF nor
the SH10 have any explanatory power for both Q and MBR.
Vari
able
ROA

Consta
nt
(13.82)

TD/T
A
F-Ind F-Com
Coefficient
(9.19)
0.05
(1.92)
t-Statistic
(1.25)
1.79* 2.05**
(0.93)
*
0.93
ROA Coefficient
(9.19)
0.18
2.43
(3.40) (9.19)
(0.05)
(1.92)
t-Statistic
(0.98)
1.79* 2.05**
(0.93)
*
(0.93)
TQ
Coefficient
20.46
(0.05)
(4.25)
4.37 14.89 (0.04)
t-Statistic
0.78
(0.23)
(1.52)
0.50
1.32 (0.34)
TQ
Coefficient
16.41
(0.05)
(4.25)
4.37 14.89
0.04
t-Statistic
0.74
(0.23)
(1.52)
0.50
1.32
0.34
MBR Coefficient
43.48
(0.10)
(9.70)
9.93 34.12 (0.09)
t-Statistic
0.74
(0.19)
(1.54)
0.51
1.34 (0.34)
MBR Coefficient
34.50
(0.10)
(9.70)
9.93 34.12
0.09
t-Statistic
0.69
(0.19)
(1.54)
0.51
1.34
0.34
Note: ***, **, * indicate significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively.
SH10
0.18

Sales
2.43

Age
(3.40)

R2
0.25

Adj.
R2
0.15

0.25

0.15

0.09

(0.03)

0.09

(0.03)

0.09

(0.02)

0.09

(0.02)

Table 5: Ownership Concentration (SH10), Structure and Firm’s Performance
Vari
able
ROA

TD/T
FSales
Age
A
F-Ind
Com
Coefficient
2.74
(2.97) (9.22) (0.00)
2.15*
(1.85)
t-Statistic
(0.09)
0.05
*
(0.78) *
(0.04)
ROA Coefficient
(1.04)
0.00
2.74
(2.97) (9.22)
0.00
2.15*
(1.85)
t-Statistic
(0.12)
0.05
*
(0.78) *
0.04
TQ
Coefficient
18.97
(0.00) (3.74) 3.75
15.29 (0.08)
t-Statistic
0.95
(0.71) (1.30) 0.43
1.36
(0.65)
TQ
Coefficient
10.73
(0.00) (3.74) 3.75
15.29
0.08
t-Statistic
0.54
(0.71) (1.30) 0.43
1.36
0.65
MBR Coefficient
41.69
(0.00) (8.50) 8.56
35.03 (0.19)
t-Statistic
0.94
(0.72) (1.31) 0.44
1.39
(0.68)
MBR Coefficient
22.60
(0.00) (8.50) 8.56
35.03
0.19
t-Statistic
0.50
(0.72) (1.31) 0.44
1.39
0.68
Note: ***, **, * indicate significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively.
Consta
nt
(0.83)

HER
F
0.00

R2
0.18

Adj.
R2
0.08

0.18

0.08

0.10

(0.01)

0.10

(0.01)

0.10

(0.01)

0.10

(0.01)

Table 6: Ownership Concentration (HERF), Structure and Firm’s Performance
The significant impact of the concentration ratios on ROA is in support of the Shleifer and
Vishny (1986) hypothesis that concentrated ownership might reduce the agency cost, and
hence increase the firm’s performance. These results are consistent with Zeitun and Gary
(2007); that ROA and ROE are the most important factor used by investors rather than the
market measure of performance. This finding is also consistent with the result of Wu and Cui
(2002) that there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and accounting
profits measured in terms of ROA. The insignificant results of concentration variables in both
Q and MBR equations could be due to inefficiency of the Sri Lankan equity market where
company fundamentals are not impounded into share price efficiently. Further, this may be
due to the incapability of capturing other types of inherent market anomalies which are
common to small markets.
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In summary, empirical evidence suggests that ownership concentration has a positive effect
on a firm’s performance. The positive effect of ownership concentration has a stronger effect
on the accounting performance measurements than on market ratios of performance
measurements

Conclusions
This paper investigates the relationship between ownership structure and concentration and
firm performance for a sample of 45 Sri Lankan public companies listed on the CSE. This
study provides useful information on the performance level and the impacts of ownership
concentration on both accounting performance and market performance. This paper not only
studies the relationship between ownership concentration and firm’s performance, but also
investigates whether the ownership structure, measured in term of fraction of shares owned
by institutions and fraction of shares owned by individuals has an effect on a firm’s
performance.
The paper produces significant and consistent results in respect of accounting performance.
First, empirical findings indicate that there is a significant relation between ownership
concentration (SH10) and the accounting performance measure ROA. Secondly, the HERF is
not significant at any level of significance in any measure of performance. The insignificance
of the HERF shows that there could be a nonlinear relationship between ownership
concentration and a firm’s performance. Furthermore, ownership concentration or ownership
structure did not show any effect on market based performance measures. This finding
suggests the existence of market anomalies in Sri Lanka which are common to most of the
emerging markets.
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